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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
 
 
 
ADVmRSARY PARTIMS-SAIM PRSON AS BOTrH PLAIN eIFV AND D4"NDANT.
-Under the regulations promulgated by the Railroad Administration in
1918, all actions for injury to persons or property growing out of the pos-
session or control of any railroad or system of transportation by the Director
General of Railroads were required to be brought against the Director Gen-
eral. ORDrR No. 50. Some courts refused to follow this order on the
ground that it was contrary to the statute creating federal control. Lavalle
v. Northern Pacific Railway Company, (igig), 143 Minn. 74; Franke v. Chi-
cago & N. W. Ry. Co., (I19), i7o Wis. 71.
But Order No. 50 has been generally observed, and actions arising
under federal control have usually been brought against the Director Gen-
eral. He was declared to be the agent of the United States through which
it exercised "no divided but a complete possession and control" of all rail-
roads for all purposes. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, (I918),
250 U. S. 135, 148.
Under this situation a float belonging to the Central Railroad of New
Jersey was rammed by a steam tug owned by the New York Central Rail-
road, and the Globe and Rutgers Fire Insurance Company, as insurer of the
float, paid the loss and brought suit against the .wrongdoer under its right
of subrogation. According to Order No. 50, the wrongdoer was the Director
General of Railroads, who was operating the New York Central Railroad
and its steam tug. But since the insurer, as subrogee, stood in the shoes of
the insured, and the insured, under federal control, was the Director Gen-
eral of Railroads, the action presented in controversy between the Director
General of Railroads as operator of the Central Railroad of New Jersey
and the Director General of Railroads as operator of the New York Central
Railroad. But no one can sue himself, even in another capacity, so that the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
the insured was absolutely without a remedy. Globe and Rutgers Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Hines, (1921), 273 Fed. Rep. 774.
The court here invokes a rule which has often been quoted in both legal
2Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 61g; Young v. Pollak, 85 Alp. 439,'5 So. 279;
McConnell v. Kelley, 138 Mass. 372.
24 It is not claimed, of course, that the power of a wife to establish a separate domi-
cile at all times is authoritatively established. See Suter v. Suter, 72 Miss. 345, 16 So.
673; Hood v. Hood, ii Allen x96. The point is not even arguable until the wife
becomes emancipated from the shackles placed on her by the common law. But there
is a decision or two where, consciously or unconsciously, the court did go to the full
extent of the position here suggested, and numerous dicta having the same tendency.
See Smith v. Smith, 4 Mackey (D. C.) 255; Thompson v. Love, 42 Oh. St. 6r, 8o; Colvin
v. Reed, 55 Pa. St. 375; Prater v. Prater, 87 Tenn. 78, 9 S. W. 361; Dutcher v. Dutcher,
39 Wis. 651, 659; Buchholz v. Buchholz, 63 Wash. 213, 15 Pac. 88.
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and equitable actions, but it has usually been deemed sufficient to state it as
a sort of axiomatic formula, without attempting to give any reason for it.
Thus, in Bryan v. Kales, (1892), 3 Ariz. 423, the court said that the presence
of adversary parties was so fundamental that if it appeared that the plaintiff
was suing personally in a suit against himself as administrator, any judg-
ment entered would be "utterly void." Similar views seem to have been
entertained in Barber v. Barber, (I9II), 32 R. I. 266, where a tax collector
sued himself as town treasurer for services. In Grahame v. Harris, (1833),
5 Gill & J. (Md.) 48, on the contrary, the court said that, although a man
cannot properly bring an action against himself, and therefore the same
party cannot regularly be placed on both sides of the case, this objection is
a technical one. The rule is stated in DictY ON PARTms To AcTIo s (rule 5)
that "The same person cannot be both plaintiff and defendant," and he says
that this rule "scarcely requires explanation, and results immediately from
the fact that it is impossible for a man himself to infringe upon his own
rights." But in Connell v. Woodard, (z84i), 5 How. (Miss.) 665, 670, the
court seemed less impressed with the inherent impossibility of such an action,
for it said the rule was confined in its operation to natural ptrsons, which
of course would destroy any claim it might have for being considered a
fundamental concept of the law. Nor is the law entirely consistent in this
respect when its asserts the identity of a party with himself in another
capacity, when it seeks to defeat an action for want of adversary parties,
and at the same time asserts want of identity where a person is joined with
himself in another capacity when it seeks to defeat an action on the ground
of misjoinder of causes of action. Grahame v. Harris, supra; I ENCY. PL.
& Pa. 178, Tit. Actions. In the same way, the law finds no difficulty in dis-
covering a total lack of identity between a party in one capacity and the
same party in another capacity when considering the effect of a judgment.
As saia in a recent case, Chandler v. White Oak Creek Lumber Co., (1914),
131 Tenn. 47, 50:
"The reason that a judgment against a party suing as an individual
is not an estoppel in a subsequent action in which he appears in another
capacity or character is that in the latter case he is in contemplation
of law a distinct person and a stranger to the prior proceedings and
judgment. Rathbone v. Hooney, 58 N. Y. 463; Jennings v. Jones, 2
Redf. Sur. 95."
When we turn to equitable suits, the courts are found to be less
inclined to consider this objection as insuperable. To be sure, the same
broad statement of the rule as an axiomatic proposition is often met with.
Thus, in 64 SoLICrIOas' JOURNAL, (March, 1920), 318, it is said:
"In the Annual Practice, under Ord. i6, rule I, it is stated, 'The
same person cannot be both a plaintiff and a defendant in the same
action, or an applicant and a respondent to the same summons.' This
is treated as, what most people would consider it, a self-evident prop-
osition-at all events, no authority is cited for it. It is, however,
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not uncommon to come across practitioners who suppose that the
same person can be a plaintiff in one character and a defendant in
another character in the same action."
A note in 5 MASSAcHUSTTS LAW QuAnTERLY, 467, (Aug. ig2o), quoting
the above statement, cites a number of Massachusetts cases where the same
rule was stated, but it also mentions others where the rule was in fact
ignored without comment from court or parties. Thus, in Welch v. Blanch-
ard, (1911), 208 Mass. 523, each plaintiff is named three times as defendant
on account of different interests in the trust fund.
The theory of parties in equity would seem to make it a matter of minor
concern whether a party is present in different capacities on the same side
or on different sides of the suit. Thus, in Goss v. Suckling, (1911), 30 N.
Z. L. R. 543, 545, the court said: "It is irregular, as it is unnecessary, in an
equity suit as at common law, to make the same person both plaintiff and
defendant." So, in 2 TARDY oN RlcIVUS, 2045, the author says: "Although
it is not good practice for a person in his representative capacity to sue
himself in his individual capacity, as where a receiver of a corporation sues
the directors, one of whom is himself, the bill is not demurrable on that
ground alone." In support of this he cites Murphy v. Penniman, (19o7),
1o5 Md. 452, where it is shown that, while prior Maryland cases had con-
demned the practice of a party being on both sides of the case, yet the prac-
tice had to some extent prevailed, and that in a court of equity, where the
rights of parties can be considered without much regard to the side on
which they appear, "the rule is not of such importance as to require the
court in all cases to dismiss the bill or sustain a demurrer to it because
such practice has been followed." Again, it has been pointed out that in
partition suits, under modern statutes, it is immaterial that the groups of
persons making up the parties plaintiff and the parties defendant contain a
common member. Blaisdell v. Pray, (1878), 68 Me. 269; Senter v. De Bernal,
(869), 38 Cal. 637.
The case under discussion, against the Director General of Railroads,
was one in which there was but a single party on each side, and therefore
it was one where the situation did not overtax the capacity of a common
law judgment. It was also an actual adversary proceeding, for the insurance
company, having paid up its loss, was entirely divorced from any com-
munity of interest with the Director General. In every respect there was
complete antagonism. There was, therefore, no chance of a collusive suit.
If this action could not be maintained the insurance company was without
a remedy. Should the court, therefore, in view of the somewhat technical
character of the objection made, have looked to the substantial nature of
the controversy, as common law courts have often done, for example, in
actions by use-plaintiffs, and have allowed the action to proceed?
If, under the federal control act, the interests of the New York Central
Railroad and of the Central Railroad of New Jersey were really antagon-
istic in the matter of the injury to the float, it would seem excessively tech-
nical to deny the only remedy possible merely because of the general rule
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adverted to. But it appears that their interests were not antagonistic. Under
the statute, 40 U. S. STAT. AT LARGE, Ch. 25, Sec. 12, all moneys received by
the railroads during federal control became the property of the United
States, and all operating disbursements, such as damages to be paid for
injuries to property, were payable out of such moneys. Hence, when the
insurance company paid the loss on the float the money went to the United
States, and if the company were to be reimbursed as subrogee on its claim
against the New York Central Railroad, the reimbursement would have to
come out of money belonging to the United States. The United States,
therefore, would in substance be required to pay back to the insurance com-
pany, by way of damages, the money which it had received from the insur-
ance company by way of indemnity. The question is, therefore, much more
than one of adversary parties. It raises the very substantial point as to
whether the insurance company was subrogated to any rights against the
insured, because of the latter's fault in connection with the loss. On this
point the law is clear. If the property is damaged by the tortious act of
the insured or its agents or servants, the insurer, if liable under its contract,
has no right of subrogation. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co.,
(I885), 117 U. S. 312. In Simpson v. Tlwmpson, (1877), 3 App. Cas. 279,
it was held by the House of Lords that where two ships, the property of
the same owner, collide, and the underwriters pay the loss, they have no
right of action against the owner of the ship that did the mischief, as he
himself had no right, inasmuch as, being the owner of both vessels, any
right he had must be a right of action against himself, which is an absurdity
and a thing unknown to the law. To the same effect, see Globe Ins. Co. v.
Sherlock, (1874), 25 Ohio St. 5o, 68.
In the case under review, therefore, the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals appears to have come to the only possible decision, and the weak-
ness in the plaintiff's case was not due to a technical rule as to parties but
to the fact that the federal statute, by consolidating all the railroads under
the unified operation and control of the United States, subjected all insurers
of railroad property to the additional burden of being deprived of any
recourse through subrogation for injuries caused by the tortious operation
of any other railroad property. Congress might have expressly saved such
right of recourse by authorizing actions by insurers in all cases where such
right of action would have existed prior to federal control, but it did not
do so. The plaintiff may, therefore, properly consider the loss of its right
of subrogation one of the burdens chargeable to the war. E. R. S.
